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History matters. On the mystifying appeal of Bowles and Gintis1 
 
Abstract 
 
Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis have made a broad and sustained contribution to many 
areas of contemporary economic thought and policy discussions, centring on human 
interactions in economic settings.  Since the mid-1980s, their work, collectively and 
individually, has developed from a concern with contested exchanges to analyses of 
behavioural repertoires pursued through evolutionary game theory in which they claim 
that ‘history matters’.  Despite their alignment with the mainstream they retain an 
appeal to some heterodox economists.  We argue that this appeal is misplaced.  Their 
theoretical work and knowledge claims rest on methodological individualism and 
equilibrium reasoning, which fosters an obtuse reductionism.  They present a confused 
methodology, which seems to be motivated by a desire to remain coherent to standard 
economics.  We show how their acceptance of methodological individualism and 
ergodic modelling undermines their knowledge claims as well as their declaration that 
history matters in their analysis.   
 
 
Keywords: Methodological individualism; history; game theory; contested exchange; 
Walras’ fiction 
 
JEL Classifications: B24; B31; B50 
 
  
                                                 
1  We are grateful for the advice, criticisms, and insights of three reviewers for this journal.  
We also thank the journal’s editors for their advice and patience.  The review process has 
undoubtedly enhanced our arguments and analysis.  Of course our acknowledgement and 
gratitude does not implicate either the reviewers or editors for remaining errors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis have made broad and substantial contributions to 
debates over egalitarian reforms, the analysis of production relations, education under 
capitalist arrangements, Marxist and Radical economics’ relations with neoclassical or 
what they term ‘Walrasian’ economics, the nature of agency and evolution in 
economics, the evolution of human co-operation and attempts to unify behavioural 
theory, and beyond.  They have acted as a catalyst of much discussion in economic 
and social theory and policy reforms2.  In short, they are prolific and notable scholars, 
who have made and continue to make a significant contribution that is worthy of 
scrutiny. 
 
They are controversial figures in heterodox economics.  In the 1960s Bowles and 
Gintis were central figures in establishing the Union of Radical Political Economics 
(URPE).  URPE was founded on the basis of the promotion of an essentially Marxian 
vision, and that if the inherent flaws of capitalism were to be successfully addressed, 
then a priority was to challenge the dominance of neoclassical economics, which was 
generally perceived to provide an intellectual defence for capitalism (see 
http://www.urpe.org/).  During this period, Bowles and Gintis contributed extensively to 
this radical agenda, most notably in the publication of Schooling in Capitalist America 
in 1976.  They set out to demonstrate that the US educational system perpetuated 
inequality, and that schooling principally socialised people to the requirements of 
corporations and had little to do with human development in a sense beyond the 
acquisition of skills for work.   
 
                                                 
2  Erik Olin Wright’s (1998) edited volume on Bowles and Gintis’ (1998A, B) egalitarian market 
reform proposals; especially the commentaries by Hausman, Levine, Brighouse, and 
England; see also Spencer (2000, 2001). 
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The tenor of Bowles and Gintis’ activities shifted markedly from the mid-1980s and into 
the 1990s with their adoption of a more mainstream theoretical and methodological 
path.  This is well documented and acknowledged by Bowles and Gintis repeatedly.  
Despite this, they retain an appeal for some heterodox economists: witness Bowles’ 
2014 Veblen-Commons Award by the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE).  
The Association made the award on the basis of Bowles’, “contributions to the 
coevolution of preferences, institutions and behaviour (including culture), plus the 
causes and results of inequality” (http://www.afee.net/).  For us, such recognition is 
contentious as both Bowles’ and Gintis’ approaches, separately and collectively, have 
little resonance with the economics that the original institutionalists seek to advance.  
Bowles and Gintis, we argue present a stylized version of institutionalism: redolent of 
new institutionalism, a faux heterodoxy. 
 
In this paper we focus on Bowles and Gintis’ recent contributions and investigate their 
analysis of institutions and behaviour referenced by AFEE.  In particular, we attempt 
to trace their ‘Post-Walrasian’3 emphasis and later embrace of evolutionary game 
theory.  In this they accuse ‘Walrasian economics’ of perpetrating a “fiction” of human 
behaviour through its atomistic analogy.  They advocate a “richer” conception of 
human behaviour, subject to institutional constraints in an evolutionary context with 
power differentials (Bowles and Gintis, 2000a).  Nonetheless, as they accept, they 
remain inspired by the mainstream approach (for example, Bowles and Gintis, 2002A), 
and following their critique of the Walrasian scaffolding, their work, as they readily 
state, represents an attempt to theoretically develop Walras.  Post Walrasianism 
retains methodological individualism, and introduces frictions to the Walrasian model 
in the form of imperfect information and departures from homo economicus.  In Bowles 
                                                 
3 Bowles and Gintis initially described their approach as ‘Post Walrasian.’  However, there is 
an air of ambiguity surrounding the term and it is not unique to Bowles and Gintis.  Colander 
(2006) and Stiglitz (1993) have also employed it in different ways.  Bowles and Gintis’ 
employment of the term is increasingly sporadic.   
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and Gintis’ theorising this develops from their notion of contested exchange to 
mathematically more sophisticated evolutionary game theory. 
 
We argue that Bowles and Gintis’ approach exhibits a reductionist tenor and provides, 
and makes a virtue of limited accounts of power, institutions and human behaviour.  
We consider that their framework propagates a new fiction that restricts potential 
explanatory depth by, for example, adhering to a restrictive methodological 
individualism to accommodate their upgraded mathematics. Their recent analyses 
offer less analytical insight than their work of the 1970s.  We briefly refer to Schooling 
in Capitalist America and their subsequent revisit (2002A) to illuminate our argument.  
Whilst our focus is on Bowles and Gintis’ recent work, we feel that reference to 
Schooling in Capitalist America is pertinent since Bowles and Gintis themselves chose 
to revisit the subject and apply their ‘new’ analytical tools in the form of a game 
theoretic approach to human capital. 
 
We do not seek to provide a comprehensive or inclusive review of Bowles and Gintis’ 
recent work; that would be an undertaking beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather, 
our references to Bowles and Gintis’ applications, through a series of vignettes, are 
indicative and with a clear focus on surfacing their theoretical commitments.  As such, 
we acknowledge that we sacrifice depth for breadth.  We feel this is appropriate given 
the scope of Bowles and Gintis’ application of their theoretical framework.  Indeed, this 
scope reveals a further alignment with the mainstream in their work: the universalism 
of technique.  Despite claims to the contrary, their application of evolutionary game 
theory across history (Bowles and Gintis, 2011) may suggest otherwise.  Thus, despite 
the ‘evolution’ of their theoretical approach since the 1990s, Bowles and Gintis have 
essentially retained a compatible method to their “Post-Walrasian” phase; centring on 
equilibrium reasoning and methodological individualism.  Yet, from our perspective, 
there has been an intriguing turn in Bowles and Gintis’ endeavour.  Gintis (2009A) in 
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The Bounds of Reason, criticises methodological individualism and subscribes to a 
stratified ontology with emergent properties.  In our view both represent a recantation 
of notable significance; the extent to which undermines the basis of Bowles and Gintis’ 
recent approaches.  That they seem to be unaware of this is interesting.  In their 2011 
work, A Co-operative Species, Bowles and Gintis appear to offer an inconsistent 
methodological stance, veering from methodological individualism to a position 
recognising human malleability.  It is such methodological inconsistency that reveals 
the inadequacy of their approach from a heterodox perspective4. 
 
The remainder of the paper adopts the following structure: section 2 sets out Bowles 
and Gintis’ theoretical positions from the early 1990s.  Section 3 outlines their 
methodological and ontological commitments over this period.  Section 4 examines 
and critiques their methodological approach, noting its inconsistency and confusion.  
Section 5 then analyses how these methodological inconsistencies impact on Bowles 
and Gintis’ theoretical contributions.  Section 6 offers some brief concluding thoughts. 
 
 
2. Bowles and Gintis’ evolving theoretical approach(es) since the early 
1990s 
 
In this section we trace the evolution in Bowles and Gintis’ theoretical approach before 
assessing their methodological perspective in Section 3, below.  We appreciate there 
is some overlap, but presenting their contributions in this way enables us to interrogate 
the nuances of their approach as well as attempting to avoid the conflation of theory 
                                                 
4  We mainly draw upon Institutionalist and Post Keynesian traditions in developing our 
argument.  We recognize and acknowledge the saliency of a Marxist informed line of 
criticism, such as around Bowles and Gintis’ limited analysis of class and value, but we feel 
that adopting a Marxist approach would extend the paper well beyond the bounds of 
toleration.  We acknowledge this limits our analysis, but given that we emphasise the role of 
AFEE in our critique, we feel that it is fitting to apply institutionalist-informed analysis. 
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and method.  Bowles (2004, p. 17) has stated that his motivations have included, “an 
interest in the impact of economic institutions on human well-being”, and a desire to 
design institutions to enhance well-being.  Bowles and Gintis (for example, 2011), draw 
upon historical cases to demonstrate the centrality of institutional arrangements to 
economic performance and the explanatory power of their approach.  In this they 
emphasise that history matters (for example, Bowles and Gintis, 2011).  They have 
written extensively on the institutions of capitalism, commencing with the 
conceptualisation of contested exchange, then what they see as the appropriate 
complementary roles of communities, markets and the state, and latterly the ambitious 
project of tracing and analysing the evolution of human co-operation (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2011).  Theoretically, this has been reflected in their break with what they term 
as ‘Walras’ fiction’ and an increasing recourse to game theory.  They are explicit in 
their desire to address what they conclude to be the Walrasian break from reality. 
 
 
2.1 Contested exchange 
 
As a central part of their Post Walrasian approach, in the early 1990s Bowles and 
Gintis developed a construct of ‘contested exchange’ contrasting it with Oliver 
Williamson’s (1993, 2000) transaction cost economics and with Walrasian general 
equilibrium. 
 
The “contest” in contested exchange is over the extra-contractual – and hence Post 
Walrasisn – conditions that enable production and exchange activities to occur 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1993; 2000A).  They use three paradigmatic examples (labour, 
goods and credit markets) to develop their theory.  In their analysis of what they 
consider to be archetypical capitalist exchanges, they argue that power is the ‘ability 
to further one’s interests by credibly threatening to impose sanctions on another agent 
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when the converse is not also true’ (Bowles and Gintis 1992, p. 325, 1993, p. 90).  
Bowles (2004) further characterises power as: interpersonal, in that it involves human 
relationships; its exercise involves the threat and use of sanctions; it is normatively 
indeterminate, which may or may not be Pareto-improving; and, “to be relevant to 
economic analysis” (2004, p. 244), power must be sustainable as a Nash equilibrium.  
Hence, “as an enduring aspect of social structure, it should reflect best response 
behaviours” (pp. 244-245).   
 
Bowles and Gintis identify ‘short side’ and ‘long side’ agents in contested exchange, 
where power is allocated disproportionately to short-siders, who are not “quantity 
constrained”.  For instance, in the markets identified as contested, they outline 
situations where employers are “short-siders” when there is ‘equilibrium’ 
unemployment, or where employees possess particularly sought-after skills, and/or 
lenders in capital markets where there is equilibrium credit rationing.  The exercise of 
power by short-sider agents is associated with “endogenous enforcement strategies”, 
such that markets act as “disciplinary institutions” (Bowles and Gintis 1998A; Bowles 
2004).  In this they also contend that there is no inevitability that agents will continually 
occupy a particular position.  Exogenously determined trends may benefit current long-
siders to the expense of current short-siders (Bowles and Gintis, 1993: 91). 
 
 
2.2 From Homo Economicus to Homo Reciprocans 
 
With contested exchange, Bowles and Gintis claim to offer a richer theoretical 
exposition of human behaviour than the Walrasian approach, which they argue 
perpetuates  “Walras’ fiction”.  The Walrasian conception of self-interested behaviour 
rests on narrow confines, which they dismiss as a, “charmingly Victorian but utopian 
world in which conflicts abound but a handshake is still a handshake” (Bowles and 
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Gintis 1993, p. 83).  They argue that the Walrasian framework is only capable of 
affording a highly mechanistic representation of behaviour redolent of ‘as if’ reasoning.  
They also note Alfred Marshall’s unease with this aspect of the Walrasian system and 
his preference for biological analogies, but chastise him for what they consider his 
failure, “to make much of these modern ideas” (Bowles and Gintis, 2000A: 1411).  By 
contrast, they identify a range of behavioural repertoires, which they argue does 
engage with ‘these modern ideas’ (Bowles, 2004; Gintis, 2000A, 2009B).  In doing so, 
they claim to recognise the contexts of human behaviour, where they define contexts 
in terms of institutions as conventions (Bowles, 2000, and Bowles, et al., 2002), and 
as such they may be represented as games.    
 
Drawing from Axelrod (1984), in addition to a more strategic variant of homo 
economicus, Bowles and Gintis identify homo reciprocans, homo egualis, and homo 
parochius.  Both homo egualis and homo parochius appear to be specific 
manifestations of homo reciprocans.  Homo egualis “emerges” in non-market 
situations and institutions and displays a proclivity for aversions to inequality, 
especially when the individual is disadvantaged.  The aversion is said to be weaker 
when the individual is advantaged, implying self-regard, with the individual preferring 
to be equal, second-best is advantaged, and least favoured is disadvantaged.  Gintis 
(2000A) claims anthropological support for homo egualis, contending that this is likely 
to be an inherent human characteristic.  By contrast, homo parochius emerges from a 
community or group context, or institution.  Members of such networks act in a 
‘prosocial’ (or favourable) fashion towards other members and correspondingly 
‘antisocially’ towards non-members.  
 
Homo reciprocans possesses three ideal typical behavioural traits: (s)he is ‘nice’ in 
that (s)he is never the first to defect from a co-operative strategy; punishing of those 
who engage in non-cooperative behaviour, even if this is costly to her/himself; and 
  
 
9 
 
forgiving of those who engaged in non-cooperative behaviour and subsequently re-
engage in co-operation (Bowles and Gintis, 1998B, p. 371).  Homo reciprocans is then 
distinct from Bowles and Gintis’ conception of homo economicus.  “Nice” is 
incompatible with the “uncompromising” and thorough pursuit of objectives, and there 
is less self-regard with the strongly reciprocal individual.  It is here that context matters, 
emphasising that homo reciprocans and homo economicus are both separate and 
hence non-universal.  Bowles (1998) refers to this contextual sensitivity as “construal 
effects”.  For example, given the nature of contested exchanges, Bowles and Gintis 
argue that homo economicus is the dominant behavioural type, and homo economicus 
contributes to the reproduction of contested exchange.  In contrast, communities 
encourage other-regarding homo reciprocans.  In Bowles and Gintis’ (1993, 2002A) 
conception of ‘new’ economic persona, the on-going conflictual orientation of 
relationships indicates an absence of trust between parties.  Yet this is not the case 
with homo reciprocans. 
 
Community governance is founded on social capital, which is claimed to be based on 
other-regarding properties, including, “a willingness to live by the norms of one’s 
community and to punish those who do not” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002A: F419).  
Communities refer to any group where the members interact in a multi-faceted fashion, 
so could encompass professional networks, gangs and groups formed around ethnicity 
(Bowles 2004, Bowles and Gintis 2002A, 2004; Bowles, et al. 2002).  A clear, albeit 
under-elaborated, association is established between homo reciprocans and trust.  
Bowles and Gintis (2000C: 7) define trust as a strategic alternative to ‘defection’ and 
‘inspection’ in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and as unconditional co-operation with 
all trading partners.  From this they assert that community networks support the 
enforcement of ‘prosocial’ behaviour by reducing information costs (2000C, p. 22).5  
                                                 
5  Throughout this paper Bowles and Gintis employ, without any explanation, scare quotations 
around the term ‘trusting’. 
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Moreover, Bowles and Gintis (2002A, F425) argue that norms are enforced in 
communities via ‘strong reciprocity’ in a ‘considerable fraction’ of their members, 
defined as individuals who are willing to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers 
even where there is no prospect or expectation of individual reward, and where those 
individuals may incur costs for their actions.  Indeed, through game theoretic 
simulations and experiments, Bowles, et al (2002) and Gintis (2000B; 2009B) seek to 
demonstrate that acts of altruism can enhance group ‘fitness.’  In contrast to contested 
exchange, power does not feature in the development of this theory. 
 
In more recent work – A Cooperative Species – Bowles and Gintis (2011) continue to 
develop their analysis of social interaction.  They invoke references to early forms of 
human society to support their emphasis on the co-operative property of human 
behaviour.  This they consider involves mutualism, where net benefits are conferred 
on all parties to an activity, and also altruism, where some individuals may be other-
regarding despite experiencing personal costs.  Both are characteristics of their homo 
reciprocans, and again are demonstrated through a game theoretic approach. 
 
 
2.3 Schooling in Capitalist America 
 
Bowles and Gintis (2002B) revisited Schooling in Capitalist America, where they assert 
that evidence since its publication in 1976 substantiates their claims concerning the 
inter-generational persistence of economic status.  Heritable IQ and the effect of 
schooling on cognitive development are both unimportant in ‘explaining’ how agents 
with more schooling experience higher earnings.  Rather, higher earnings are more 
likely to be a consequence of personality traits than skills.  Their “correspondence 
principle” was central to their original explanation: schools structure social relations 
and interactions to correspond to work situations.  In presenting a model of the 
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acquisition of cultural traits by children through parents and schooling, Bowles and 
Gintis highlight two principles: schools influence the cultural models to which children 
are exposed; and children are subject to rewards and sanctions.  They demonstrate 
the effects of this in a model where cultural transmission is either vertical (through 
parents) or oblique (through school).  They identify two cultural traits, A and B, where 
B has a payoff of 1, and A less than 1.  They argue that education can impact on 
cultural transmission in the following way: if teachers are A, then the children of A 
parents will tend not to switch.  However, B children will face a choice.  If the structure 
of education incentives is such that trait A is rewarded to a greater extent than B, then 
a “significant number” of B children will convert to A even though the payoffs of B are 
higher in adult life (Bowles and Gintis, 2002B, p. 14). 
 
In this Bowles and Gintis (2002B) are critical of “socialization theory”, which they argue 
articulates the process of cultural transmission such that schools socialise students to 
accept values and forms of behaviour on the basis of authority as opposed to 
individuals’ own judgements.  Socialization theory is further criticised for projecting the 
adoption of different types of behaviours as a, “black box; it does not explain how 
individuals learn what” (Bowles and Gintis 2002B: 12).  Hence, for them, socialization 
theory is incompatible with, “widely accepted notions of human agency” (Ibid) that 
highlight rationality and choice making capabilities.  They appeal instead to “framing 
effects”.  In this, again, institutions are viewed as constraints and institutional stability 
equates to Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
2.4 Residential Segregation 
 
The breadth of the application of their recent work is worthy of note.  For instance, 
Bowles (2004) considers an example of failure in community governance in terms of 
  
 
12 
 
racial residential separation in three of the most segregated US cities (Cincinnati, Los 
Angeles and Milwaukee).  According to “surveys”, residents prefer more integrated 
communities (Bowles, 2004, Ch. 2).  Bowles establishes an “evolutionary” model that 
“shows” that in a housing market with identical homes the replicator dynamics of social 
interaction in housing sales can lead to co-ordination failure, which finds expression 
as residential segregation.  His model specifies random pairings between buyers and 
sellers of both races (blues and greens).  Both agent types have preferences such that 
they would prefer to see their neighbourhoods populated in a mixed fashion, but with 
a majority of residents of their race.  Further, the model specifies that the proportion of 
prospective buyers from outside the neighbourhood reflects the current composition of 
the neighbourhood.  Bowles argues that his model shows that even though both 
greens and blues prefer mixed neighbourhoods they may end up in totally 
homogenous areas as opposed to areas with a 50:50 division.  The latter is not a stable 
equilibrium, whereas the former is.  In other words, given the preferences of blues and 
greens as specified in the model, community governance reaches a Nash equilibrium 
with segregation. 
 
In our view, the foregoing brief résumé of Bowles and Gintis’ work indicates that their 
theoretical emphasis has shifted from power (of one person over another), as 
expressed through contested exchange, to co-operation as collective action.  Indeed, 
in their analysis of co-operation, trust appears as both an alternative and a complement 
to power.  As with their analysis of power, their later phase embodies a mainly 
conscious, strategic and instrumental interpretation of trust, centred on how agents 
relate directly to one another.  Agents are expected to calculate whether a potential 
partner in exchange can be trusted, and this is bound up in the deliberate and strategic 
development of personal reputation and its deployment.  More generally, they consider 
the Walrasian system refers to transactions that are uncontested or “solved political 
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problems”.6  By contrast, they claim that their notion of exchange is putting the 
“political’ back into ‘political economy’”.  However, Bowles and Gintis have consistently 
never attempted to conceal that they view their work as contributing to the corpus of 
the mainstream in economics.  They are committed to the Walrasian system in the 
sense of equilibrium reasoning.  Through their use of “information economics” (Bowles, 
2004, p. 9) and the ‘new analytical tools’ (Gintis, 2009B, xvii) afforded by game theory, 
they seek to enhance the explanatory power of standard economics (for example, 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002B, F423).  In this respect Bowles and Gintis may be located in 
what Davis (2006) terms as, “the recent turn” in mainstream economics.  Their 
approach in “contested exchange”, for example, is closely aligned to Williamson’s 
transaction cost economics in terms of a shared methodological orientation, which 
embraces methodological individualism.  We expand our case further, below. 
 
 
3. Bowles and Gintis’ method 
 
Given the foregoing, it is no surprise that Bowles and Gintis’ methodological lens is 
decidedly mainstream.  Their emphasis lies in equilibrium reasoning, methodological 
individualism, and the universalism of technique across a range of phenomena: 
witness the vignettes, above, and their 2011 game theoretic venture tracing the 
evolution of human co-operation.  Importantly, in Bowles and Gintis’ opinion game 
theory has two great virtues: an emphasis on the strategic nature of many interactions, 
and its foregrounding of alleged, “institutional detail” (Bowles, 2004, p. 32). 
 
                                                 
6  Bowles and Gintis (1992: 331; 1993: 86) cite Abba Lerner as the source of the view that 
economic transactions were solved political problems.  Lerner refers here to economics’ claim 
to be the ‘queen of the social sciences’ by concentrating on a narrow (idealized) domain that 
permits formal tractability. 
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Bowles and Gintis’ emphasis is on reviewing experimental games, in which agents 
carrying one of a limited number of traits interact in either random or structured patterns 
over periods of time (for example, Bowles, 1998; Bowles and Gintis, 2000, 2002A; 
2011, and Gintis, 2000B, 2009B).  Tournaments may be constructed as simulations in 
which different behavioural strategies or traits play against one another in applications 
of games first worked out deductively.  Bowles and Gintis express the dynamic nature 
of this system as time-discrete stochastic models, which can be captured by Markov 
chains (Bowles, 2000, pp. 378-379; 2004, p. 411; Gintis, 2009B, p. 297ff).  The Markov 
process produces a (positive) ‘transmission matrix’, such that any particular system-
state will be conveyed to any other state with a positive probability.  In other words, a 
Markov chain is a sequence of random variables, X1, X2, X3 … with the property that 
given the present state, future and past states are independent (for example, Manning, 
et al, 2008; Tweedie, 1974).  This may be presented formally as: 
 
𝑃(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑥 𝑋1⁄ = 𝑥1,𝑋2 = 𝑥2…𝑋𝑛 = 𝑥𝑛) = 𝑃(𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑥 𝑋𝑛⁄ = 𝑥𝑛) 
 
Possible values of Xi form a countable set S, which is the state space of the chain.  For 
a finite Markov chain, a system in each period t = 0, 1, … can have any one of n states, 
such that if a system is in a particular state i in any given period, there is a probability 
pij that the system will be in state j in the following period (Gintis, 2009B).  There are a 
number of variations of Markov chains, including; continuous-time, stationary, memory 
(m) chains – where future states depend on past m states – additive chains with 
conditional probability, and ‘denumerable’ chains, which posses an infinite number of 
states (Manning, et al, 2008).  For present purposes these distinctions are not of 
central importance, beyond noting that in his major work in 2004, Bowles opts for the 
ergodic finite chain variant, which invokes a number of assumptions, and which we 
reflect on in the following section.  Bowles’ preference for ergodicity implies that his 
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game theoretic models attain long-run equilibrium.  In short, ergodicity relates to 
systems with a stable structure over time.  This is a key characteristic of closed system 
modelling, which is central to equilibrium reasoning (Lawson, 1997).  By contrast, non-
ergodicity implies that both structures and the nature of reality are to varying degrees 
mutable through time, giving rise to uncertainty and time irreversibility (see for 
example, Davidson, 2003; Dow, 2003; Dunn, 2003). 
 
Also consistent with game theoretic reasoning, Bowles and Gintis are, at various points 
in their work explicit about their adoption of methodological individualism (see also, 
Baker and Weisbrot, 1994).  For instance, in their analysis of “community governance” 
as a complementary and/or alternative institutional constellation to the market and/or 
state, they observe: 
 
“We introduce a model using the methodological individualism and equilibrium 
orientation of economics (specifically, game theory)” (2002A, F424, original 
parenthesis). 
 
In his 2004 book Bowles offers a more detailed reprise when he defines 
methodological individualism as: 
 
“An expression of reductionism in social science that insists that explanations 
of group-level phenomena such as institutions or aggregate output must be 
built up from the actions of individuals.  The approach taken in this book is 
consistent with methodological individualism in that it has focused on causal 
mechanisms connecting what individuals do to aggregate social outcomes” 
(2004: 478). 
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Later, Bowles argues his notions of endogenous preferences and cultural evolution 
represent a recognition that social institutions and individual preferences co-evolve: 
“thereby not privileging either the lower- or higher-order entities” (2004, p. 481, original 
emphasis).  As with Gintis’ (2009A, B) later evolutionary emphasis noted above, 
Bowles appears to recognise a stratified ontology, which invites the possibility of 
system openness.  This is of particular interest, especially given Bowles and Gintis’ 
avowed methodological individualism in that it suggests a tension with a more 
restrictive ontology associated with standard analysis (Lawson, 1997); a subject we 
examine in the following section. 
 
Overall, as we have noted, Bowles and Gintis’ methodological orientation has evolved 
with an increasing recourse to game theoretic techniques accompanied by the 
employment of sophisticated mathematics.  Gintis’ (2009A, B) recent works, in 
particular, display an analytical approach firmly grounded in mathematics.  This in part 
reflects Gintis’ strong affinity with the view that mathematics offers the tools 
appropriate to apprehending complex (socio-economic) reality and facilitating the 
development of novel theories (Gintis, 2000A: xv).  Despite such on-going allusions to 
theoretical novelty centring on the unification of behavioural theory, evolution, and co-
operation in (late?) capitalist societies, we argue in the following sections that their 
framework is not as powerful as they presume, and rests on inconsistent 
methodological grounds.  We explore the latter point initially. 
 
 
4. A case of methodological incoherence and contradiction? 
 
We concentrate on two significant aspects of Bowles and Gintis’ method – both 
identified in Gintis’ (2009A) work: game theory and ahistoricism, and methodological 
individualism.  As noted, we readily acknowledge the well-established methodological 
  
 
17 
 
critiques of game theory in the (economics) literature (see for example, Hargreaves 
Heap and Varoufakis, 2004; McCloskey, 2006; Mirowski, 2002; Rizvi, 1994; Sugden, 
2001), and do not seek to reproduce many of those arguments.  Nor do we wish to 
venture directly into the territory of the use of mathematics in economics, although our 
concern about Bowles and Gintis’ equilibrium reasoning obviously encroaches on this 
area7.  Instead, we wish to critically explore the tensions in Bowles and Gintis’ 
methodology underpinning their assertion that “history matters” (for example, Bowles, 
2004: 411) in their analysis of the evolution of, for instance, the institutions of capitalism 
(which they attempt to capture through contested exchange) and of humans’ 
inalienable co-operation.  From here we consider their methodological individualism 
and Gintis’ (2009A) potentially devastating recantation.  Section 5 outlines our views 
on the implications for their framework and ontological perspective. 
 
 
4.1 Of game theory and ergodicity: does history really matter to Bowles and Gintis? 
 
At one level history does matter to Bowles and Gintis, because they explicitly and 
repeatedly claim that it does.  In doing so they are keen to highlight how their theories 
can apprehend particular historical events and processes, such as the property rights 
“revolution” (Bowles and Choi, 2002), the persistence of poverty, inequality, and 
economic decline (Bowles, 2012), and the evolution of human co-operation (Bowles 
and Gintis, 2011).  Yet the question is begged as to whether their methodological 
approach justifies their claim. 
 
As noted, in a key passage of his 2004 book, Bowles writes: 
                                                 
7  For an excellent exposition of the flaws of mathematical reductionism in economics see 
Dennis (2002).  Dennis argues that reducing economic propositions to mathematics lacks 
logical rigour as these propositions cannot be apprehended by mathematics alone. 
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“Its state [Markov process] is path dependent: where it was in the recent past 
influences where it will most likely be at any moment.  History matters, and it 
never ends” (2004, p. 411). 
 
According to Bowles, the positive probability associated with the transition matrix of 
the Markov processes in an ergodic system entails that despite the independence of 
long-run equilibrium from initial conditions “history matters”.  The nub lies in the 
“positive probability” of transition from one state to another over two different periods.  
The past reveals its future with a calculable probability. 
 
Yet Bowles’ invocation of ergodicity in Markov chains implies that a number of 
conditions (assumptions) pertain.  In Markov processes a state i is ergodic if it is 
aperiodic, irreducible, and positive recurrent (for example, Tweedie, 1974).  
Aperiodicity refers to the non-zero probability of returns to a certain state i at irregular 
times.  A chain is irreducible if it is possible to attain any state form any state.  
Recurrence concerns the transient character of a state: if state i is the starting point, 
then there is a non-zero probability that state i will never occur again.  These conditions 
indicate that ergodic Markov processes are time reversible – it is possible for state i to 
reoccur at some point in the future.  This is literally history repeating itself.  For i to 
recur exactly the same conditions and features must be replicated from the initial i.  In 
other words, the passage of historical time has no bearing at all on the probability of 
transition from one state to another in a specific time frame. 
 
In contrast to Bowles, Gintis (2009B, p. 298) writes: 
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“In an ergodic system, history does not matter: every initial condition leads to 
the same long-run behaviour.  Nonergodic systems are history dependent” 
(emphasis added). 
 
Gintis is surely correct, given the conditions of ergodicity.  However, for Bowles and 
Gintis, we are left with a disjuncture: either Bowles (2004) is correct or Gintis (2009B) 
is, they both cannot.  This is not a trivial point.  They contend that their analysis places 
history as a significant dimension.  Yet they make opposing observations about the 
relevance of history to their primary mode of analysis.  Either history matters or it 
doesn’t.  Of course, the issue may be clarified by definitional precision – it could be the 
case that Bowles and Gintis are referring to two related, but distinctive things when 
they separately use the term ‘history’.  We understand history as pertaining to the 
processes by which social and economic phenomena emerge, and how humans 
acquire agency to develop futures from these settings.  Certainly Bowles’ (2004) usage 
seems to differ from a chronology of past events or the study of past episodes, given 
that events do not appear to feature in his discussion of transitions from one state to 
another in the Markov process.  By contrast, Gintis’ (2009B) discussion of non-ergodic 
games centres on a specific event – the death of a player at some point during the 
game8.  In this way history does matter; there is an obvious event and therefore 
historical contingency.  Rather, Bowles’ employment of ‘history’ appears to refer to 
‘time’, and not necessarily historical time. 
 
Two points emerge: Bowles’ employment of ‘history’ appears inaccurate, at least in 
terms articulated by Gintis.  Bowles may be conflating notions of history and time, 
                                                 
8  Gintis’ (2009B: 298) two examples relate to a repeated prisoners’ dilemma and a trading 
game.  In both games Gintis identifies a key dislocation in the conduct of the game – not 
unsurprisingly.  However, in both cases Gintis outlines the adoption of an identical strategy – 
in the prisoners’ dilemma the deceased player is replaced by a clone – and the Markov chain 
is complete. 
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where the latter may be seen as reversible.  Indeed, reference to Post Keynesian 
accounts of ergodicity, suggest the opposite of Bowles’ position. Davidson (2003), in 
particular, emphasises that ergodicity is a highly misleading caricature of the nature of 
uncertainty and dynamic processes.  He argues that ergodicity implies that: 
 
“All economic relationships are timeless or ahistoric ‘natural’ laws.  The 
historical dates when observations are collected do not affect the estimates of 
statistical time and space averages” (2003, p. 232, emphasis added). 
 
Second, if ergodicity is an important aspect of their method, as both appear to 
acknowledge, then Gintis appears to be (logically) relegating the importance of history 
in their analysis.  If this is indeed the case, then history cannot be their analytical entry 
point; rather, we venture, historical episodes are selectively employed to demonstrate 
the robustness of their models. 
 
An additional aspect to this argument arises in Bowles’ reference to path dependency 
in Markov chains.  As is well-known, path dependency invokes notions of lock-in, 
especially of technology, and that the future is to some degree the hostage of the past.  
This meaning suggests resonance with Bowles’ emphasis on the influence of the 
“recent past”.  Bowles’ analysis of ‘history’ and evolution are peppered with allusions 
to path dependency (for example, the index to Bowles’ Microeconomics, 2004, p. 579).  
Whilst path dependence is a significant consideration in evolutionary analysis, it is not 
the only one.  The uncertainty of the future also highlights the potential for path creation 
(for example, Hodgson, 1999; MacKinnon, et al, 2009); yet this does not figure in either 
of Bowles’ and Gintis’ analytical approaches.  Notably, Kaldor in his critique of 
equilibrium reasoning railed against economists’ failure to sufficiently recognise the, 
“creative functions [of markets] – as an instrument for transmitting impulses to 
economic change” (1972, p. 1241).  Again, we may question Bowles and Gintis’ 
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commitment to a methodology embracing history and historical contingencies as 
important factors in evolutionary processes.  Accordingly, we are puzzled by AFEE’s 
reference to Bowles and Gintis’ analysis of “institutions and behaviour (including 
culture)” as in any way compatible with the ideals of original institutionalism. 
 
 
4.2 Methodological individualism and reductionism: a recantation, or confusion? 
 
We noted in section 3, above, Bowles and Gintis’ embrace of methodological 
individualism, and Bowles’ approval of the reductionism of methodological 
individualism as a means of apprehending social outcomes through the actions of 
individuals. 
 
Hodgson (2007) has argued that there is considerable ambiguity regarding the 
definition of methodological individualism, especially in economics.  Indeed, even in 
heterodox economics there is some contention over the nature of methodological 
individualism: witness the exchange in the Review of Social Economy between 
Hodgson (2011; 2012) and Milonakis and Fine (2012).  For our purposes we find 
Hodgson’s delineation to be instructive. 
 
Hodgson (2007; 2011) identifies two variants: (1) social phenomena should be solely 
explained in terms of individuals alone; (2) social phenomena should be explained in 
terms of individuals and relations between individuals.  Hodgson argues that (1) is in 
practice impossible.  Social phenomena presume some sort of relationships and 
interactions between individuals, and hence there is an ontological distinction between 
those individuals and the nature of their interactions.  By contrast, in (2) social structure 
features in analysis.  The issue, following Hodgson, is the degree to which social 
structure is integral to explanation.  In our view, a framework is methodologically 
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individualistic if it privileges the role of individuals over social structure, in effect making 
structure passive, orthogonal or in a setting’s environment.  Bowles and Gintis’ work 
falls within (2), but their methodological individualism is problematic in that it implies 
that the analytical entry point is some given individual.  There are, however, profound 
ontological and epistemological problems associated with this position, which also 
further undermine Bowles and Gintis’ claim that “history matters”. 
 
Ontologically, individuals are born into systems of institutions.  Interactions between 
individuals, even in game theory, presuppose some social position associated with 
both the individuals and their interactions.  As Marx and Veblen instruct, such social 
positions imbue the holder(s) of a particular position or role with specific rights, duties, 
obligations, and powers (for example, Davis, 2003; Milonakis and Fine, 2012; 
Hodgson, 2004; Lawson, 2012, 2015).  Thus, by virtue of its title, the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma in classic game theory is predicated on specific social roles associated with 
the properties of being designated as a ‘prisoner’ ascribed to the individual players, 
presumably by some legitimate authority (perhaps the institution of the state).  Bowles 
in his methodological prescription – “explanations of group-level phenomena such as 
institutions or aggregate output must be built up from the actions of individuals” (2004, 
p. 478) – alluded to earlier, is either unaware or ignores the explanatory requirement 
that individuals’ actions cannot be devoid of the properties of sociality.  Indeed, such 
explanations always fail on the need to account for the social positions that individuals 
occupy.  These social positions require some social and institutional explanation 
(Hodgson, 2007).  For instance, Lawson (2012) in his argument that emergent 
phenomena are irreducible invokes historical contingency and organisation.  In the 
context of social emergence, Lawson (2012, p. 364) argues, 
 
“Collective practices, as emergent forms of organising structure, are efficacious 
in facilitating coordinated interaction in that their reality is established.  And it is 
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because they are irreducible to the individuals and individual practices that they 
organise that their relative autonomy is equally grounded …” 
 
In The Bounds of Reason, Gintis (2009A, chapter 8.8) appears to recognise such 
methodological issues.  He seems to adopt a volte face in his declaration: 
 
“Methodological individualism is inadequate … because human nature in 
general, and human rationality in particular, are products of biological evolution.  
The evolutionary dynamic of human groups has produced social norms … It is 
a mistake … to think that social norms can be brought within the purview of 
game theory by reducing a social institution to the interaction of rational agents” 
(2009A, p. 163, original emphasis). 
 
This critique is of tremendous significance and, in our view, amounts to a recantation 
of Bowles and Gintis’ methodological individualism.  Gintis appears to open the 
methodological door to explanatory depth in terms of the social embeddedness of the 
individual and a stratified ontology.  In a key passage he argues: 
 
“Game theory has progressed by accepting no conceptual constructs above 
the level of the individual actor, as counselled by methodological individualism.  
Social theory operating at a higher level of aggregation … has produced 
important insights but has not developed an analytical core on which solid 
cumulative progress can be based.  The material presented here [Bounds of 
Reason] suggests the fruitfulness of dropping methodological individualist 
ideology but carefully articulating the analytical linkages between individually 
rational behaviour and the social institutions that align beliefs and expectations 
of individuals, making possible effective social discourse” (2009A, p. 162, 
emphasis added). 
  
 
24 
 
 
Prima facie, Gintis presents a compelling case for the abandonment of the basis of 
Bowles and Gintis’ analysis of contested exchange and their account of the 
constellation of institutions in capitalism.  For Bowles (2004, pp. 47-48) institutions are 
defined as: 
 
“Laws, informal rules, and conventions that give durable structure to social 
interactions … Conformity to the behaviours prescribed by institutions may be 
served by a combination of centrally deployed coercion (laws), social sanction 
(informal rules), and mutual expectations (conventions) that make conformity a 
best response” (original emphasis) 
 
This complements Gintis’ emphasis on the linkages between institutions and 
individuals, save for Bowles’ later endorsement of methodological individualism in the 
same volume.  However, Bowles’ conceptualisation of institutions is inadequate and is 
not necessarily incompatible with his rendering of methodological individualism.  
Bowles’ definition is consistent with Hodgson’s second variant, noted earlier.  It is 
inadequate in its reductionism: institutions, according to Bowles, are constraints to 
individual free-will for which Nash equilibrium is conformity.  The individual, especially 
their possession of defined and self-known preferences, and their calculating and 
economizing capacities, is taken as given – there is no malleability.  In this, Bowles’ 
methodological individualism can only accommodate a particular interaction between 
agent and structure.  It cannot account for the enabling, creative, and constituting 
dimensions of institutions.  For instance, institutions through the social roles individuals 
come to occupy enable those individuals to plan, anticipate, experiment, communicate, 
organize with others, and reflect upon certain courses of actions; constrain them from 
taking others; partially shape which actions are a matter of agreement to the individual, 
ie., they influence an individual’s proclivities, and they may also afford an avenue for 
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creativity.  In effect, institutions partly constitute individuals9.  Only one of the foregoing 
is consistent with Bowles’ approach, and both variants of methodological individualism 
identified by Hodgson (2007; 2011). 
 
Gintis’ call for the abandonment of methodological individualism presents the 
opportunity for less reductionist explanations, and hence the greater explanatory 
richness he seems to seek.  Yet, as we explore in section 5, below, it potentially 
undermines the theoretical scaffolding he and Bowles have constructed for over twenty 
years.  There are, however, further inconsistencies in their methodological orientations 
worthy of consideration. 
 
Bowles and Gintis (2011, p. 4) write that humans, “internalize the norms that induce 
cooperation”.  This is a clear rejection of methodological individualism as it suggests 
that institutions are not merely constraints to individual actions, but they also partly 
constitute those individual’s preferences and thinking.  Nonetheless, Bowles and Gintis 
in the same work continue to cite their previous work predicated on methodological 
individualism (as well as ergodic game theoretic equilibrium modelling) with approval.  
And yet, Gintis (2009A, xiii) has written: “game theory is not everything”, but is 
instrumental in comprehending human social existence as a complement to “broader 
social theory”. 
 
Despite his seeming recantation of methodological individualism, Gintis (2009A, p. 
236) continues to subscribe to and advocate the standard maximization assumption of 
mainstream economics.  Pace Simon (1991), he argues that it does not follow that 
since individuals’ rationality is bounded that they are not maximizers.  So long as 
individuals’ behaviour is routinized and their preferences are consistent then standard 
                                                 
9  Institutions are of course, following Thorstein Veblen (1969), also partly constituted by 
individuals. 
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optimization modelling is appropriate.  Gintis’ advocacy seems curiously at odds with 
his rejection of methodological individualism and the potential of individual malleability.  
His allusion to routines as a basis of maximising as opposed to satisficing behaviour 
appears redolent of Becker’s rationale and reductionist ‘as if’ reasoning.  Indeed, Gintis 
refers to billiards players in the same way as Friedman (1953) in his advocacy of 
maximization: noting billiards players, “do not solve differential equations … even 
though we may use … optimization models to describe their behaviour” (2009A, p. 
236). 
 
These inconsistencies and incompatibilities, in our view, undermine any claims Bowles 
and Gintis may have to methodological coherence.  They appear to embrace 
methodological individualism at one instance only to abandon it, and then perhaps to 
re-embrace it.  Ergodic modelling is said to ensure that history matters (Bowles, 2004); 
yet the other in the partnership (Gintis, 2009B) argues otherwise, whilst advocating 
such a method.  In the following section we trace how these inconsistencies damage 
Bowles and Gintis’ theoretical claims and analysis by referring to the cases outlined in 
section 2, above, and entail a muddled ontology – at once individuals are privileged 
over social structures and then they are not. 
 
 
5. Methodological discrepancy and its effects on theory 
 
Bowles and Gintis claim deeper insights than the Walrasian approach and to address 
‘Walras’ fiction’ by offering theoretical refinements to the Walrasian framework that 
consistently align to mainstream nostrums.  At a theoretical level their ambition is to 
contribute to a unified behavioural science and to extend evolutionary reasoning.  This 
is highly laudable.  Yet they do so by finessing the Walrasian approach that they 
critique.  In our view, their methodological inconsistencies and their interests in 
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equilibrium reasoning, methodological individualism, reductionism, and relegation of 
history undermine their ability to overcome the inherent weaknesses of the Walrasian 
system.  In this section we re-visit the four areas of Bowles and Gintis’ theorizing 
identified in section 2, above, where their methodological attachment to mainstream 
tenets and their own inconsistencies weaken the knowledge claims they make: 
behavioural theory, power and contested exchange, Schooling in Capitalist America, 
and racial residential segregation in housing.   
 
 
5.1 Homo reciprocans and homo economicus: Towards a unified behavioural 
theory? 
 
In Bowles and Gintis’ analysis homo reciprocans adopts a tit-for-tat strategy and is 
never first to deviate from co-operation.  Co-operation in community networks permits 
the emergence of trusting Nash equilibria (Bowles and Gintis, 2000).  Following their 
utilisation of standard rationality and methodological individualism, trust is founded on 
strategic and instrumental interpretations.  By reducing trust to a strategic alternative, 
the dualistic nature of Bowles and Gintis’ behavioural analysis is exposed.  Frequently 
in their work agents are stylised in a binary fashion – for instance, altruistic or non-
altruistic – to demonstrate strong reciprocity.  The reduction of calculative trust cannot 
account for the innateness of trust in human behaviour, the different types of trust, the 
extent of trust, and institutional sources of trust (see for example, Baier, 1986; 
Nooteboom, 2002).  For instance, in the case of homo reciprocans there appears to 
be a requirement for high degrees of trust in the goodwill of fellow players involved in 
the initial play of any interaction.  In other words, the rules of the game are such that 
trust is the appropriate and dominant strategy.  Should a transacting party betray this 
goodwill, Bowles and Gintis suggest that homo reciprocans will retaliate by imposing 
some form of “punishment”.  Given the miscreant will face losses, the actor will 
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subsequently pursue a more co-operative strategy.  Homo reciprocans “forgives” and 
responds co-operatively as if nothing had happened.  Perhaps reflecting the ergodic 
property of the modelling, this assumes a particular type of trust that is not only 
calculative but time-reversible, of a behavioural repertoire understood in a context as 
an entity being deployed, withheld and redeployed as a resource.  It portrays homo 
reciprocans as possessing no memory, or being extremely forgiving.  Homo 
reciprocans is prepared to transact on the same terms as before with a party that can 
and has deceived.  Contra Bowles and Gintis, much of the literature on trust 
emphasizes its fragile, conditional and embedded nature (Nooteboom, 2002; Morgan 
and Sheehan, 2015).  The betrayal of trust can entail irreparable damage to a 
relationship, and an unwillingness to entrust to the same degree in any subsequent 
dealings.  These properties are notably absent from Bowles and Gintis’ depiction.  We 
venture that real time and learning effects appear to be assumed away in their 
framework: history decidedly does not matter.  If the foregoing is an accurate depiction 
of homo reciprocans, Bowles and Gintis’ analysis of trust is disconnected to the social 
dimension in a manner criticised by Gintis (2009A). 
 
The problem of reductionism is further evident in Gintis’ (2000A, B) analysis of the 
emergence of homo recipricans through the formal invocation of Price’s Equation from 
biology.10  Informally, this states that a trait that enhances the fitness of a particular 
group will emerge to out-compete other traits and so enhance the relative average 
fitness of the group.  Bowles and Gintis deploy this in respect of strong reciprocity 
(altruism).  In a population composed of groups of individuals, altruism is assumed as 
a trait that enhances the fitness of groups, but not necessarily altruistic individuals (it 
may be costly to the individual who is an altruist).  Those groups with more altruists 
                                                 
10   Formally Price’s Equation is expressed: 
, where  is the expectation term,  is the covariance term, 
x is the frequency of a trait in the population, and  is the mean fitness of the population. 
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will out-compete those groups with fewer (or no) altruists, implying that as average 
fitness improves in groups with altruistic individuals altruism emerges as a dominant 
trait (see for example, Bowles and Gintis, 1998B, 2000B, C, 2002A; Bowles, et al, 
2002; Gintis, 2000B; Heinrich, et al, 2001). 
 
This account of emergence of homo reciprocans is formalistic and ahistorical, and 
arguably does not resonate with Gintis (2009A).  Given the historical context of 
capitalism, and their paradigmatic example of exchange in capitalism (contested 
exchange) and its accompanying dominant behavioural repertoire (new homo 
economicus), some tensions are revealed in their account of community governance 
and homo reciprocans in capitalist society.  For instance, we would anticipate that 
agents have a high probability of adopting the persona of new homo economicus in 
part of the employment relationship, and simultaneously resemble homo reciprocans 
in another.  The personality change stems from the dualism of their approach and its 
corresponding discreteness concerning institutional context.  Bowles and Gintis’ 
assertions over the emergence and evolution of behavioural traits appear to rest on 
the crucial auxiliary assumption relating to context, which for them means the rules of 
the game.  Yet these rules are presumed constant and exogenous.  Pace Gintis 
(2009A), emergence and evolution at different scales are precluded: in effect, a 
stratified ontology is ruled out.  While institutions are durable, they are subject to 
change and Bowles and Gintis’ analysis cannot accommodate this.  The explanatory 
burden rests on the pre-game specification of rules, or the institutional context. 
 
Thus, if Bowles and Gintis’ behavioural repertoire is to be rescued, there has to be 
some appeal to the (partially) constitutive properties of social systems and institutions.  
However, this would mean the abandonment of methodological individualism as they 
conceive it.   
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5.2 Contested exchange and power 
 
The foregoing brings us to Bowles and Gintis’ notion of contested exchange, albeit that 
this features far less prominently in their more recent work.  Recall, this notion held 
that exchange under capitalist arrangements frequently involves parties with unequal 
power – the short-sided (more powerful) and long-sided (less powerful).  For Bowles 
and Gintis, power is relational – it is exercised by an individual upon another individual. 
 
By incorporating power in “relatively uncontroversial” terms (Bowles and Gintis 1993, 
p. 88); like new institutionalist and new Keynesian approaches they omit discussion of 
how power is maintained, exercised, constrained, and legitimised.  Further, it is a 
matter of contention that power is understood as one agent’s ability to impose 
sanctions on (an)other agent(s) when the converse is not true.  An agent’s power is 
embedded in social structures, institutions and other norms and may be multi-
directional (for instance, Hodgson, 1999; Jessop 1990; Lukes 2005).  Power may be 
dispositional – the power to act in certain ways – imbued in the capacities of social 
agents (Lukes, 2005: 71). 
 
Following Bowles and Gintis, agents are more or less powerful through finding 
themselves on the (powerful) short or (quantity constrained) long sides of relations of 
contested exchange.  They provide a sketch of how agents come to occupy short and 
long sides of contested exchanges:   
 
“The wealthy have power … because they tend to be located on the short side 
of non-clearing markets: as lenders in capital markets and as employers in 
labour markets – employers are more likely to be wealthy because lack of 
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wealth generally precludes access to funds on terms consistent with survival in 
business” (2000, p. 1422).   
 
This is something of a tautology.  The historical independence of the framework implies 
that wealth is the cumulative outcome from a previous out-of-equilibrium and non-
clearing market, or is inherent from some initial distribution of assets (or ‘wealth-
blocks’).  In this, Bowles and Gintis’ discussion of power is rather disconnected from 
the notion of social embeddedness.  The exercise of power is conceived within the 
confines of Nash equilibrium (Bowles 2004: 345).  There is nothing to associate power 
directly with social structure and individuals to occupying roles in that structure.  There 
is little regard for the complex interaction of power and legitimacy: the latter an enabling 
function of institutions.  In short, Bowles and Gintis’ embrace of methodological 
individualism inhibits their analysis – as Gintis (2009A) seems to recognise. 
 
Bowles and Gintis are correct in situating power as possessing a relational dimension, 
yet limitedly so.  It is social positional rights and obligations that imbue individuals with 
the potential to influence the behaviours of others.  Lukes (2005), for example, directs 
explanations of the emergence and effects of power away from agents and towards 
social, structured and institutionalised social situations, such as markets.  Power 
changes from being a resource particular to one agent, to being embedded in a 
connection or relationship between two or more agents.  Lukes states: 
 
“Social life can only properly be understood as an interplay of power and 
structure, a web of possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and 
structured, to make choices and pursue strategies within given limits, which in 
consequence expand and contract over time” (2005, pp. 68-9). 
 
Similarly, Lawson argues: 
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“It thus seems reasonable to refer both to rights and to obligations as 
(positional) powers.  Indeed, they are constitutive of what might reasonably be 
termed social, collective or positional power.  Such power … expresses 
positional rights and obligations to participate in specific others-affecting 
collective practices that are granted to accepted occupants of relevant 
positions” (2012, pp. 367-8, original emphasis). 
 
This cannot be apprehended by adherence to the view that there are no conceptual 
constructs above the level of the individual as (again) Gintis (2009A: 162) 
acknowledges.  Lukes’ reference to a “web of possibilities”, and Lawson’s allusion to 
“collective practices” are not only constraints: they possess deontological properties 
and articulate how positions are enabling of the exercise of power (a view endorsed 
by the original institutionalists; Hodgson, 1999).  By contrast Bowles and Gintis’ 
conception rests on the narrow notion of a quantity constraint – they cannot 
convincingly address the question as how such a situation arose. 
 
In this they share a striking resemblance to Williamson’s transaction cost framework.  
For Williamson (1993, 2000), opportunistic potential arises from a similar array of 
asymmetries identified in Bowles and Gintis’ Post Walrasian contested exchanges.  
Power, in Williamson’s framing, may be conceptualized through the prism of 
opportunism in that opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile” conceives of 
agents manipulating their situation to their advantage.  Thus, in Bowles and Gintis’ 
paradigmatic example of employees possessing sought after skills, for Williamson this 
may be expressed as asset specificity.  Specific assets are the analytical “locomotive” 
of Williamson’s theory: asset specificity engenders situations of asymmetric 
information prompting bounded rationality to be experienced by one of the contracting 
agents (in Bowles and Gintis’ terminology the “long-siders”) and opportunistic potential 
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by the other (Bowles and Gintis’ “short-sider”).  However, Williamson’s explanation is 
rather more appealing in that there is some development on how an opportunistic 
environment may emerge and recede; with Bowles and Gintis there is nothing. 
 
 
5.3 Schooling in Capitalist America 
 
In their 1976 work Bowles and Gintis recognise the importance of social 
embeddedness and the rights and obligations associated with position.  In tones 
redolent of Lawson, noted in 4.2 above, they argue: 
 
“However well they actually function technically, individuals must act, speak, 
and dress commensurate with their position and must actively protect their 
prerogatives” (1976, p. 82) 
 
They further consider: 
 
“The importance of legitimacy cannot be overemphasized in understanding the 
social relations of corporate enterprises … US capitalism accomplishes the first 
of these requirements [workers’ cognitive and operation skills] through the 
family, school, and on-the-job training …” (Ibid) 
 
Their analysis here highlights issues of power in a more meaningful way than in their 
contested exchange in that their analysis permits the malleability of individuals to a 
particular suite of values that legitimises a specific hierarchical class relations.  This is 
not consistent with methodological individualism, where the individual is effectively 
taken as given.  The explanatory approach adopted in Schooling in Capitalist America 
is markedly divergent from that employed in their 2002 revisit: witness Bowles and 
  
 
34 
 
Gintis’ (1976, p. 128) argument: “Consciousness develops through the individual’s 
direct perception of and participation in social life”.  Further, in outlining their 
“correspondence principle” they state: 
 
“The structure of social relations in education not only inures the student to the 
discipline of the work place, but develops the type of demeanor, modes of self-
presentation, self-image, and social class identifications which are crucial 
ingredients of job adequacy” (1976, p. 131, emphasis added). 
 
The key term here is “inures”, i.e. habituates.  By this reckoning the individual is 
malleable, thereby implying a rejection of methodological individualism.  For Bowles 
and Gintis in 1976, and Gintis in 2009A, the individual is socially embedded!  
Notwithstanding this, Bowles and Gintis’ “correspondence principle” was criticized as 
being overly-simplistic and reductionist in relating the structure and content of “mass 
schooling” to the requirements of the capitalist economy.  This view neglects the 
myriad of competing interests that shape school curricula by presenting a simplified 
production-based model of class struggle (for example, Brown and Lauder, 1991; 
Brighouse, 1998). 
 
Arguably, such reductionism is more apparent in Bowles and Gintis’ (2002B) revisit.  
Their model of the transmission of cultural traits in keeping with their Post Walrasian 
learning is conflated with the acquisition of information.  Recall that in their 
reproduction of their correspondence principle they frame their model in terms of 
schools influencing cultural models to which students are exposed, and children are 
subject to a rewards and punishment regime.  Their model is expressed in terms of a 
particular type of replicator dynamic, which invokes the student actor facing a binary 
choice of cultural type and having to respond to incentives in exercising their choice.  
Bowles and Gintis’ appeal to framing effects in the same way as the mainstream 
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conception of information asymmetries.  The adoption of cultural traits is, as they 
recognise, sensitive to the reward structures faced by rationally calculating school 
students, or as they express it, 
 
“Depending on the specific assumptions of the model and the specific value of 
the parameters, there can be two stable ‘homogenous’ cultural equilibria … or 
a single ‘heterogeneous’ equilibrium” (2002B, p. 14). 
 
In fashioning their updated model of Schooling in Capitalist America, Bowles and Gintis 
substitute their class-based framing in 1976 for a human capital model based on the 
rational acquisition of particular cultural traits in 2002.  Of course, the irony is that they 
were heavily critical of the conception of human capital in 1976, but by 2002 human 
capital was, apparently, de rigueur. 
 
As noted in 2.3 above, Bowles and Gintis are critical of socialization theory on the basis 
that it robs the individual of agency.  This, in our view, is a valid criticism; some forms 
of what they term as ‘socialization theory’ do indeed marginalise the individual, laying 
the explanatory weight, in the extreme, entirely on structure.  In making this critique 
Bowles and Gintis claim: 
 
“Our analysis of the capital-labor conflicts of the content and form of schooling 
is understandable without recourse to the theory of socialization as presented 
in standard sociology” (Ibid.). 
 
For us, this is not a warranted assertion.  Bowles and Gintis, in their attempt to consign 
socialization theory to the margins, throw the baby out with the bathwater.  In their 
revisit of Schooling in Capitalist America, school students are instilled with 
considerable decision-making prowess.  They are akin to consumers subject to 
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information scarcities.  Much like goods in a market, ‘cultural traits’ are supplied by 
teachers and other agents, such as ‘neighbour elders’ as well as families.  This 
information is then evaluated by the consumer/student prior to making a conscious 
decision about which ‘cultural trait’ to adopt.  In selecting between two mutually 
exclusive traits the process of the model is mechanistic.  Moreover, it presents a 
reductionist and contentious analysis of learning.  Learning is not reacting to incentives 
and attaining information (to calculate future discounted payoffs).  Rather, drawing 
from institutionalism, it has the potential to reconstitute the individual in terms of 
expectations, capabilities, aspirations and preferences (Hodgson 2003).  In pursuing 
their methodological individualistic approach, Bowles and Gintis’ ontological 
perspective is narrowed: they are unable to furnish the historically contingent and 
socially embedded model that their 1976 version accomplished to a greater degree, 
albeit with limitations.  Their 2002 revisit is notable in that it serves to reduce their 
analysis to a problem of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in the 
generation of human capital – the generic issue of much of new institutional 
economics. 
 
 
5.4 Residential segregation 
 
Bowles’ (2004) modelling approach to residential segregation in US cities (section 
2.1.4) reproduces the approach Bowles and Gintis (2002B) adopted in their revisit to 
Schooling in Capitalist America.  Again, evolutionary game theory is called upon to 
reconstruct historical residential patterns.  As with their 2002 revisit to schooling there 
is no account provided for the specification of model parameters – how do we arrive 
at these properties?  Are we to concur that they are merely determined exogenously?  
Or, as Bowles (2004) would have us believe, they are based on empirical evidence, 
such as his allusion to “surveys” in various US cities.  The evidence base seems 
  
 
37 
 
selective in that it appears to be confined to a statement of preferences.  Indeed, given 
Bowles’ specifications, the model’s results are hardly surprising or enlightening.  The 
burden of explanation falls on pre-simulation preferences and specified replicator 
dynamics.  Bowles’ explanatory account of residential racial segregation is contingent 
upon a given and stable historical context so has no requirement analytically for 
multiple level evolution.  His model assumes away other potentially significant 
explanations, including; changes in property right entitlements, the constitutional and 
legal environment, banking practices, trust, income and wealth distributions, 
educational opportunities, and so forth that may offer additional or rival explanations. 
 
 
6. Some concluding thoughts 
 
At the outset of our argument we acknowledged the broad and substantial 
contributions to economic theory and policy that Bowles and Gintis have made over 
the past forty-plus years.  We believe that this is an extensive and valuable body of 
work.  Their recent economic journey, to our minds, makes fascinating reading: they 
do not shy away from posing big questions and the scope of their ambition is highly 
commendable.  Nonetheless, Bowles and Gintis have, as we have endeavoured to 
demonstrate, attempted to contribute to economic theory and policy using a limited 
and confusing methodology.  As we have repeatedly noted, they are explicit in readily 
acknowledging that their framework is embedded in the mainstream, and intentionally 
so.  Indeed, their work reveals a strong commitment to the Walrasian system – 
equilibrium is retained and history and historical contingency are placed in the margin.  
Essentially, they tinker with Walrasianism.  In any critical analysis of their work it is 
inevitable that more general critiques of the mainstream are, and should be employed.  
We have sought to exercise this in respect to their specific claims about the insight of 
their approach. 
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Throughout their work Bowles and Gintis have asserted that “history matters” in the 
interrogation of socio-economic reality; yet, their methods and analytical tools suggest 
otherwise.  While they have also drawn upon and supported methodological 
individualism, in 2009, Gintis offered a recantation of the saliency of this approach, and 
hence the fundamental basis of their work over the past twenty or so years.  Yet 
somewhat confusingly, their most recent work appears to invoke methodological 
individualism again.  The limitations in methodological individualism are well known, 
and we have discussed them in the context of Bowles and Gintis’ approach; indeed, 
Gintis (2009A) alludes to and endorses such criticisms.  Such meanderings are 
indicative of not only methodological inconsistency but also incoherence.  To us it 
seems that Bowles and Gintis are keen to endorse standard economic method even if 
this means that they furnish limited accounts of the phenomena in which they seek to 
explain.  Thus, in their modelling of what they depict as the quintessential form of 
capitalist interaction – contested exchange – they can only provide a reductionist view 
of power.  Similarly, their account of homo reciprocans is constrained by the 
ambiguities and contradictions of their treatment of history.   
 
So what are we to make of Bowles and Gintis?  They raise important questions, but 
their attempts to address them are unconvincing, because of their adherence to Post 
Walrasianism, which contrary to their claims, provides stylized and marginal accounts 
of history, culture, and institutions.  This, we believe, is crystallized by the two versions 
of their Schooling in Capitalist America.  The 1976 version seemed to embrace 
historical contingency and the social embeddedness and malleability of individuals, 
and thereby furnished an intriguing and challenging analysis.  By contrast, their 2002 
revisit was preoccupied by establishing the “rules of the game” in contrasting two ideal 
typical and mutually exclusive “cultural traits”, where the individual was reduced to the 
status of a “player” subject to information asymmetries.  Gone was the historical and 
  
 
39 
 
institutional richness of their 1976 investigation; instead they offered analytically an 
ahistorical game. 
 
Despite their claims to knowledge and ambitious scope of their project, in our view they 
offer little more than a sophisticated mathematical modelling of a virtual world founded 
on stylized conceptions of Post Walrasian actors.  Modelling is possible at the expense 
of insights and additional or alternative explanations that might be garnered from a 
broader array of behavioural, cognitive, habitual and broadly institutional framings.   
 
Given the nature of our argument, it remains a puzzle as to why Bowles and Gintis 
appeal to some heterodox economists.  The 2014 Veblen-Commons Award to Sam 
Bowles by AFEE seems mis-aligned, given his contributions to research.  Moreover, 
when Bowles taught a post-graduate course in “Theoretical Institutional Economics” 
(Bowles, undated) during his time at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, his 
extensive list of readings makes no reference to Thorstein Veblen.  While Armen 
Alchian, Friedrich Hayek, Douglass North and Talcott Parsons feature, Veblen, the 
seminal contributor to institutionalism in economics, is absent.  When Veblen does 
figure in Bowles’ work (Bowles and Park, 2001; 2005), Veblen’s name is misspelled.   
 
In short, we believe that those interested in progressing heterodox approaches in 
economics should at the very least tread warily when encountering Bowles and Gintis, 
especially given the endorsement of various heterodox economic bodies, such as 
AFEE.  Bowles and Gintis have made no secret of their desire to enhance the 
Walrasian approach.  Their Post Walrasian economics progresses by means of the 
theoretical ‘innovation’ of information problems, and as far as we understand, have 
never convincingly challenged mainstream method, although Gintis’ criticisms of 
methodological individualism could be viewed as such.  However, this is unconvincing, 
given that later work (2011) seems to endorse the position that Gintis criticized two 
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years prior.  Seen in this light, Bowles and Gintis are closely aligned with New 
Institutionalist and New Keynesian approaches.  Accordingly, they have, in our view, 
contributed little to progressing Post Walrasian economics as an alternative approach 
in economics. 
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